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Using Smartphone Motion
Duncan Hodges and Oliver Buckley
Abstract—Smartphones and tablets are becoming ubiquitous within our connected lives and as a result these devices are increasingly
being used for more and more sensitive applications, such as banking. The security of the information within these sensitive
applications is managed through a variety of different processes, all of which minimise the exposure of this sensitive information to
other potentially malicious applications. This paper documents experiments with the ‘zero-permission’ motion sensors on the device as
a side-channel for inferring the text typed into a sensitive application. These sensors are freely accessible without the phone user
having to give permission. The research was able to, on average, identify nearly 30 percent of typed bigrams from unseen words, using
a very small volume of training data, which was less than the size of a tweet. Given the natural redundancy in language this
performance is often enough to understand the phrase being typed. We found that large devices were typically more vulnerable, as
were users who held the device in one hand whilst typing with fingers. Of those bigrams which were not correctly identified over
60 percent of the errors involved the space bar and nearly half of the errors are within two keys on the keyboard.
Index Terms—Computer security, computer hacking, keyboards, sensors
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
THE use of mobile devices, whether smartphones or tab-lets, has become ubiquitous with our hyper-connected
lives [1]. They are now used for not only communicating
with friends and family but also for performing all sorts of
tasks ranging from accessing the internet through to more
sensitive applications such as shopping and banking. Many
popular sites report that access from mobile devices is
far more common than ‘traditional’ laptop / desktop access.
This shift in the use of mobile devices from a personal com-
munication tool to a personal ‘productivity’ tool has
increased the amount of potentially sensitive material and
activity performed on them. These smartphones have
become increasingly personal and how we trust others and
share these phones has become increasingly complicated [2].
As these devices now hold such sensitive information it
is more important than ever to be able to secure them and
much research has been performed on the permissions
model governing them (e.g., [3], [4], [5], [6]). This permis-
sions model, in addition to the file storage model [7], are the
key mechanisms by which the Android devices attempt to
protect sensitive information in one application from other,
potentially malicious, applications. The research presented
in this paper explores one particular way to bypass this
security model such that one application can ‘observe’ the
data being typed in another application. In essence this cre-
ates a keylogger capable of extracting sensitive data input
into other applications.
In this paper, we discuss an experiment using Android
smartphones and tablets that demonstrates it is possible to
infer the key presses on any Android smartphone or tablet
purely from the motion sensors. The motion sensors are
freely accessible to applications on the device, without
express permission being sought from the user. This paper
continues in Section 2 with a discussion of the academic
background to this research, Section 3 then discusses an
experiment to explore typing on soft-keyboards. Section 4
discusses the analysis of the experimental data, whilst
Section 5 covers the implications for mobile users, app
developers and device manufacturers. Finally the conclu-
sions of the paper are explored in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
Digital connectivity is becoming increasingly intertwined
with our daily lives and as a result the tasks that are
performed on smartphones and tablets have become more
personal and we have become inseparable from our smart-
phones [8], 40 percent of smartphone users describe them as
‘something they could not live without’ [9]. This degree of depen-
dence is twinnedwith an increase in the breadth and sensitiv-
ity of tasks performed on these smartphones with 43 percent
looking for information about jobs, 40 percent accessing
Government services or information, 62 percent looking up
information about health conditions, 44 percent looking up
real estate listings or information about a place to live and
57 percent access online banking services [9].
The standard approach to security on personal devices is
through a permissions-based model, which relies on the users
having the ability to perform a relatively complex risk-based
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security decision in order to allow an application to access
potentially sensitive information (such as the address book) or
capability (such as location sensors). This complicated model
has been shown to be difficult for most users to manage. This
can be either because users are unable, or unprepared, to fully
realise the risk associated with granting permissions to an app
[6] or because apps are ‘overpriviliged’ meaning they request
greater permissions than are required to perform their func-
tion [10]. In addition to this permissions model, application
sandboxing attempts to limit the effect of an untrusted ormali-
cious application. This sandboxing attempts to ensure that an
app cannot access information within other, potentially sensi-
tive, applications (whether during execution or data ‘at-rest’).
There have been several pieces of malware on the Google Play
store that have been downloaded a significant number of times
that either fraudulently send SMS or perform other malicious
acts. Researchers have identified eleven such applications
which have each been installed over 5million times [11].
In this research we are concerned with the side-channels
that could potentially allow information to leak from a sen-
sitive application to a malicious application. There has been
research which has considered the electromagnetic and
power profiles of the device in order to infer sensitive infor-
mation from within applications [12]. We particularly focus
on how the phone moves in order to infer information from
one sensitive application.
The sensors in smartphones have been used to good
effect to infer a wide range of information about an individ-
ual solely based on the way that they interact with the
smartphone’s touchscreen, for example inferring the length
of the user’s thumb [13] and as a result estimating their
height or being used infer the user’s gender [14]. They can
also be used to infer the user’s gait patterns [15], the activity
being performed [16] even location and travel routes [17],
[18]. The accelerometers have also been used to infer infor-
mation outside the context of the device, effectively using it
as a network enabled sensor [19], [20].
Motion sensors within smartphones have previously been
used to attempt to infer a user’s keystrokes with promising
results. TouchLogger [21] was a smartphone application
designed to infer the keystrokes on a soft keyboard based
solely on the vibrations recorded by the smartphone’s motion
sensors. The research was capable of successfully inferring
more than 70 percent of the keys that were typed using only
the device‘s accelerometer. However, the work focused spe-
cifically on inferring the keystrokes from a soft keyboard that
contained only numbers. The work that we present in this
paper will look to infer the keystrokes of an individual that
use a standard soft keyboard. Similarly, Xu et al. [22] present
TapLogger, an approach that looks to infer an individual’s
taps on a numeric keyboard using a smartphone’s accelerom-
eter and gyroscope. This work differs from our own in that it
focuses on identifying single taps, which are more suscepti-
ble to distortion by linear drift. Our approach looks to iden-
tify pairs of keystrokes, or bigrams, which provides a much
more robust identification method that is less affected by lin-
ear drift. Thework of Aviv et al. [23] builds on the idea of PIN
identification using motion sensors. However, where previ-
ous work had focused on single taps, their work introduces
the notion of recognising and inferring the swipe gestures of
a user’s PIN.
More recently Shen et al. [24] have built in the approach
taken by TapLogger [21] with taps being recorded with the
accelerometer with the gyroscope and magnetometer used
to infer the positions of the taps. The authors carried out an
empirical study in line with previous studies, with 30 partic-
ipants using a range of screen sizes, data sizes and sampling
rates. Their work focused on identifying key presses on a
numeric keypad where they found they could detect when
the key presses occurred 100 percent of the time and were
able to correctly identify the key that had been pressed
80 percent of the time ‘in some cases’. The accuracy of key
detection ranged from 71.4 to 83.9 percent depending on the
conditions. Again, this work differs from the work that we
present in that it focuses solely on detecting key presses on
a numeric keyboard as opposed to our own work that uses
the an alphanumeric keyboard. Additionally, Shen et al.
[24] aim to identify single taps, as with the work of Xu et al.
[22], which can lead to distortion.
Other work has focused on password compromise, for
example, Owusu et al. [25] uses a smartphone’s accelerome-
ter to infer the characters, both letters and numbers, con-
tained within a user’s password, although with a relatively
small set of only four participants. The work was capable of
extracting the 6 character passwords in around 4.5 attempts.
The work of Miluzzo et al. [26] on TapPrints builds on this
idea of keystroke identification by looking to determine the
location of the tap on a smartphone screen. This is used ini-
tially to understand the icons that may have been tapped,
and so the applications that were launched. This work then
takes this concept further to try and identify individual key-
strokes on a virtual keyboard. This work focusses on single
taps, which again will perhaps provide a less robust result,
that can be susceptible to linear drift. The results suggest that
there is an 80 percent accuracy in predicting an individual let-
ter which is in line with our own results of around 81 percent
accuracy in bigram prediction. However, the sample size of
only 10 volunteers is notably less than the 53 participants in
our own work but the dataset of around 40,000 keystrokes is
much larger than our own. Our work collects 138 characters
per participant, which is less than the size of a Tweet, as we
are focused on the minimum amount of data that might be
needed to correctly identify a user’s keystrokes.
Themajority of the currentwork in this area relies solely on
the use of smartphone motion sensors, however, the work of
Narain et al. [27] builds on this idea to incorporate the stereo-
scopic microphones on an Android smartphone. This work
developed amethod that used both the gyroscope and stereo-
scopic microphones on a smartphone and that was around
90 percent accurate in its predictions. This work was con-
ducted with only seven participants and was limited to three
devices (Samsung S2, Samsung Tab 8 andHTCOne), whereas
ourwork allowed for any compatible Android device.
The majority of the work has focused only on the use of
accelerometer readings, in contrast to our own work, which
includes analysis of rotational data using the smartphone’s
gyroscope. When a phone is being used by an individual it
tends to be held in a hand that is either unsupported or with
the wrists resting on a surface, if the device is being held in
two hands with the thumbs for typing it tends to be held
loosely and tilted in the palms in order that the relevant keys
are closer to the thumb. If a device is held in one hand the
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same phenomena occurs however the aim tends to be to
reduce the amount the ‘pecking’ digit has to move. Whilst
these movements are relatively subtle they are observable
both by the human eye and by the smartphone’s sensors.
We anticipate this behaviour is repeatable based on the
concept of motor learning, the process by which individuals
acquire or develop skills, through experience. Fitts and
Posner [28] suggest a three-stage model of motor learning
where a skill will become more ‘automatic’ as familiarity
increases, this results in a performance requiring little or no
conscious thought. This lack of concious thought has led to
typing on traditional keyboards being as distinguishing as
an individual’s handwriting or signature, since there are
similar governing neurophysiological mechanisms [29],
[30]. There is no fundamental reason why this same process
of motor ‘memory’ should not also be the case in governing
the use soft-keyboards on devices and resulting in a repeat-
able unconscious motor behaviour.
3 METHOD
The initial pilot experiments in this research used one device
(a Google Nexus 5X) upon which all the experiments were
performed, this demonstrated the correct identification of
approximately two-thirds of pairs of keystrokes that had
been seen before and around a quarter of pairs of key presses
not seen before [31]. This work expands on the initial rese-
arch by allowing the results to be gathered from a range of
phones and tablets and by individuals not being directly
supervised by the researcher. It is very important that a par-
ticipant is able to use their ownphone, our initial study relied
on using a device which they may not have seen before, this
will effect the natural way in which the device is used and
may have under-represented the repeatability and hence the
transition of the model from training to test phases. This
paper also introduces different approaches to building and
matching the model such as Dynamic Time Warping, these
whilst more computationally expensive are expected to pro-
duce significantly improved results.
In order to ensure that the application was available to a
wider audience it was submitted to both the Google Play
store and the Amazon App store, the main App Stores for
the Android ecosystem. A number of previous researchers
have taken similar approaches to delivering research appli-
cations to a wide range of users and devices throughout the
world, most notably the Device Analyser application [32].
The application was compatible with over 13,000 devices
on the Google Play Store, and followed a very simple flow.
An initial Activity provided the consent and participant infor-
mation sheetwhilst also checking that the device had the rele-
vant sensors available. Following this participants were
asked a number of demographic questions including: their
age, handedness, how long they had owned the phone or tab-
let and how comfortable they were using the keyboard. The
next Activity asked how the participant held the phonewhilst
typing (whether in the left hand, right hand or both hands)
and what the participant uses to press the keys (just fingers,
just thumbs or both fingers and thumbs). There were no
requirements placed on the orientation of the device, with the
participants free to use the device in the way in which they
felt most comfortable. We found that the orientation of the
device did not impact the results or accuracy of the research.
The participant is then asked to type a paragraph of fixed text
twice, this formed ‘experiment 1’ and ‘experiment 2’, the text
was calculated to explore the full breadth of the keyboard
whilst being short enough to be approximately the length of a
tweet (132 characters):
fly me to the moon and let me play among the stars our
freedom of speech is freedom or death we have got to fight
the powers that be
The participants were then asked to type a random set of
English words that were constructed from the bigrams
(two character substrings) in the fixed text, this formed
‘experiment 3’. Finally participants were asked how easy they
found the task and how distracted theywere. The application
then launched their email program and attached the data files
with the final consent form and the participantswere asked to
re-read the consent form before sending the data to the
researchers. During the study the device recorded the outputs
from the gyroscope sensor and the accelerometer. These time-
series along with the key down and key up times from the
keyboard form the main experimental data. During the study
it was assumed that all participants were stationary, although
this was not explicitly specified. It is entirely possible that the
accuracy of the results could be altered in different scenarios,
for example when walking. The research presented here does
not assume that this attack would be successful in all scenar-
ios. For this study auto-complete was disabled in order to rely
purely on the observed typing behaviour, and at this stage
‘swipe’ keyboards were disabled so the participants purely
used the standard action of pressing individual keys.
The sensors on smartphones are generally small devices
and often subject to drift, by using the rotation from one
keypress to another keypress to characterise the two key-
presses this method is only affected by the non-linear com-
ponent of changes in the sensor performance. Should we
attempt to identify individual keypresses using the gyro-
scope and accelerometer we would be affected by both the
linear and non-linear changes in the sensor performance. It
may be possible to use tri-grams or higher orders of n-gram,
however the volume and diversity of training data required
becomes significant.
An example of the data gathered as part of the experi-
ment is shown in Figs. 1 and 2 for one example user.
Fig. 1. Example timeseries captured from the gyroscope.
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Participants were recruited across traditional social
media channels using snowball sampling [33] and also pub-
licising the study through participant recruitment channels
of Reddit and other websites. This wider reach attempted to
reach as broad a range of smartphone and tablet users as
possible. The study recruited 53 participants, all of whom
were over the age of 18.
4 ANALYSIS
The cohort was recruited with the age distribution shown in
Fig. 3, as can be seen most participants fall into the 20-40 age
bracket with the largest group of participants being in their
thirties. The participants generally had their device for less
than 18 months, as shown in Fig. 4 and generally considered
themselves at least comfortable with the soft-keyboard as
seen in Fig. 5. We found no correlation between the partic-
ipants’ age and how comfortable they were with the soft-
keyboard, we also found no correlation between how long
the participant had owned the device and how comfortable
they considered themselves to be. However, as could have
been predicted we did find a correlation between how
comfortable a participant was with a soft keyboard and how
easy they found the task (when asked after the experiments),
a Pearson’s Chi squared test resulted in a Chi squared statis-
tic of 15.877 (p-value of 0.01443).
Through distributing the application across the App
Stores the aim of the study was to explore the performance
not only across a variety of individuals but also a variety of
devices. The participants used a range of phones and tablets
from a number of different manufacturers, see Fig. 6, this
distribution is well aligned with that we would expect to
see in the Android marketplace, for example as shown in
[34] with the exception of Lenovo devices potentially being
under-represented within our sample.
As we would expect the devices used in this study had a
range of sizes and screen resolutions the resolutions were
grouped into the descriptive terms used by the Android OS
which are defined as MDPI (x  200), HDPI (200  x <
280), XHDPI (280  x < 400), XXHDPI (400  x < 560)
and XXXHDPI (560  x).
The physical size was calculated using the resolution and
the screen size in pixels—it should be noted that this is only
Fig. 2. Example timeseries captured from the accelerometer.
Fig. 3. Distribution of the age of the study participants.
Fig. 4. Distribution of the length of time participants have had the device.
Fig. 5. How comfortable participants were with their device keyboards.
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the touchscreen size and does not include the size of the
bezel or external housing. The distribution of the device res-
olution and sizes are shown in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively,
these show that most devices had higher screen resolutions
(consistent with most devices being under 18 months old)
and generally between 4.5 and 6 inches (consistent with
smartphone or small ‘phablet’ sizes) in addition to a number
of 7 and 10 inch tablets.
The Android ecosystem divides device sizes into Small
( 3:5 Inch), Normal (3:5  x < 5), Large (5  x < 7) and
XLarge (7  x). Interestingly whilst there are indications of a
relationship between the device size and the comfort level
with users of Large and XLarge devices generally being less
comfortable than those of normal sized, a Pearson’s Chi-
sqaured test resulted in a statistic of 12.17 and a p-value
approaching significance at 0.058. Approximately three
quarters of those participants with XLarge devices reported
they were uncomfortable with the soft-keyboard.
4.1 Identification of Key Presses
As described previously the approach that we take in this
research is the use of the motion of the device in order to
identify the bigram that was typed. We must first identify
the timestamps of the two key presses forming the bigram
and then use the rotation between those timestamps to iden-
tify the letters forming the bigram.
The first step in this approach is to be able to identify the
key presses, for this we use the accelerometer on the device.
We annotated a key press when the magnitude of the accel-
eration component exceeded a threshold, this threshold was
derived using the key press data gathered in the training
phase of experiment 1. This threshold was not constant
across the study, and was a result of the training phase
using experiment 1 and hence was a function of both the
individual’s typing and the device.
The magnitude of the acceleration was found to be the
most discriminative for the identification of the key presses,
for some devices the acceleration in the ‘z’ direction (i.e.,
‘into’ the device) was also discriminative, however we
found that for some larger devices the performance was
worse than using the magnitude.
The magnitude of the accelerometer measure for an
example user is shown in Fig. 9. This shows the optimum
Fig. 6. The device manufacturers used by participants in the study.
Fig. 7. The resolution of devices used by participants in the study.
Fig. 8. The size of devices used by participants in the study.
Fig. 9. An example of the threshold used for the keypress detection.
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threshold for this particular user working as derived from
the training data associated with experiment 1.
The Relative Operating Characteristics (ROC) [35], [36] of
this detection process is shown in Fig. 10, as can be seen the
performance of the detector is, in general, good.
The Area Under Curve (AUC) metric is the probability
that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive
instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one [37].
A boxplot of this metric for each participant across the
experiments are shown in Fig. 11, the average performance
being 0.885, in effect correctly identifying the time at which
key presses occur approximately nine out of ten times.
4.2 Identification of Bigrams
In this research we are primarily interested in identifying
the potential side-channel available through the movement
of the device and as such the initial mechanism that was
used to identify the bigrams used a very simple model.
More complex models are explored in Section 4.5.
Initially this process trained a model for an individual
participant on the recordings from experiment 1, this model
was then validated using experiment 2 and 3. Using
experiment 1 as training data we first identify the rotation
vectors in x, y and z dimensions that are associated with
each bigram, i.e., the time-series from the rotation sensor
from the first key-down until the second key-up. These
time-series were resampled to a common number of regular
samples (in this case 1,000 per bigram) to remove any linear
variation in the flight time between key presses. Each vector
component is then normalised by removing the mean—this
was found to reduce the effect from previous bigrams since
the model now simply encodes the change in rotation rather
than being dependent on the starting orientation of the
phone. Where bigrams had multiple occurrences in the
training data the vectors were averaged.
An example of the model components for one user is
shown in Fig. 12. There are some similarities in the x and y
rotation captured in the model, however model components
capturing the rotation in the z direction are the inverse of
each other. Noting the positions of the ’f’, ’l’ and ’y’ keys on
a keyboard we can clearly see the left-to-right motion cap-
tured for the ’fl’ bigram and then right-to-left motion cap-
tured for the ’ly’ bigram in the rotation in the z dimension.
Thismodelwas then verified against the data from experi-
ment 2 and 3, this process identified key presses using the
approach described in Section 4.1, the rotation vectors were
then extracted between these timepoints. These rotation vec-
tors were then resampled and the bigram in the model with
the lowest RMS error was deemed to be the corresponding
bigram. This very simple ‘naive model’ treats each bigram as
completely independent meaning that a poor prediction in
one bigram is not propagated to those adjoining bigrams.
We can create a more realistic model since, logically, the
first letter of a bigrammust be the last letter of the preceding
bigram. This ‘bigram model’ takes the error across all pre-
dictions of individual bigrams and attempts to create the
sentence with the lowest overall error which obeys the
logical rule that a bigram must start with the preceding
bigram’s end letter. Initially this method uses the naive pre-
dictions which give an error measure of a particular bigram
in a particular position in the sentence, in the naive model
we simply take the bigram in a particular position which
produces the minimum error. In this ‘bigram model’ we
Fig. 10. The Relative Operating Characteristic of a simple threshold
detector for detecting key presses.
Fig. 11. The AUC metric for detecting key presses across the three
experiments.
Fig. 12. The example model components for the bigrams ‘fl’ and ‘ly’.
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take the first bigram in the first position, then consider all
the bigrams in the second position which begin with the
end letter of the bigram in the first position. This represents
the possible two bigram combinations which are logically
possible, the error term of these bigram pairs is then the
sum of the individual error terms. This process continues
until the all logically possible combinations beginning with
the most likely start bigram have been calculated, the pro-
cess then moves onto the next possible start bigram. Hence
we calculate the error term for all logically possible combi-
nations of bigrams, to manage the computational challenge
of this at every level we only retain the million combinations
that have the lowest error. Note, this logical assumption
does not consider the use of language or the fact that some
bigrams are more likely in some languages. A trivial exam-
ple of this process is shown in Tables 1 and 2.
The ability of these two models, the ‘naive model’ and the
‘bigrammodel’, is shown in Fig. 13, the accuracy ismeasured
as the number of correctly guessed bigrams normalised to
the number of bigrams. Average performances of 49.5 and
69.7 percent were displayed from text that has been seen
before and 10.5 and 16.1 percent for new text. While this per-
formance may appear low, note that this performance is
from a single piece of training text less than the size of a tweet
(132 characters) using a trivially simple model, and for some
participants this performance is significantly higher.
We found that the errors were not randomly distributed
across the bigrams. The ten most common confusions are
shown in Table 3, this shows the normalised count of confu-
sions, i.e., the number of times bigrams are incorrectly
guessed normalised by the number of times the bigram
appears in the text. As can be seen the most common mis-
takes are generally close on the keyboard.
It is noteworthy that 62.4 percent of the errors are caused
by bigrams that involve the space-bar, the space-bar is sig-
nificantly wider than other keys this means the target area
for the digit is much larger than for other keys. This larger
target means that the user is less constrained as they move
from key-to-key and hence the behaviour is less repeatable.
For example, the error with the highest normalised count
was mistaking the bigram s followed by SPACE with the
bigram e followed by SPACE. The keys s and e are adjacent
on a keyboard with the space bar underneath both and
hence the rotation of the phone or tablet will be similar
between the two bigrams; this means a user is likely to use a
similar movement to transition from one keypress to
another. Should the start keys be further apart the center of
the rotation of the device is likely to involve a more discrim-
inatory component in the ‘roll’ of the device.
Fig. 14 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of the distance from the correct key to the key that was in
error. From this we can see when an error occurs that around
40 percent of the first letter of the bigram when in error was
within 2 keys of the correct letter and around 50 percent of
the second letters when in errorwerewithin 2 keys.
4.3 Factors Affecting the Accuracy
In our initial work on this topic we explored a small subset
of factors that could influence the accuracy of the prediction
method including whether fingers or thumbs were used to
type on the soft-keyboard, how comfortable the participant
was with the keyboard and the median flight-time per par-
ticipant (that is the time from a key-up to the next key-
down) and we found no effect from these factors [31]. Since
this initial study only used one smartphone (a Nexus 5X)
Fig. 13. The accuracy across the two different experiments using the two
different methods.
TABLE 3
The Most Commonly Confused Bigrams
Truth Predicted Normalised Count
|s | |e | 10.7
|h | |b | 9.0
|le| |me| 8.0
|h | |n | 8.0
|h | |om| 8.0
|t | |r | 7.8
|e | |d | 7.7
|at| |ar| 7.5
|t | |e | 7.2
|h | |to| 7.0
TABLE 1
Example Bigram Scores from Naive Model
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
Bigram RMS Err. Bigram RMS Err. Bigram RMS Err.
|ab| 0.01 |bc| 0.03 |t | 0.04
|db| 0.05 |ec| 0.06 |c | 0.05
|ae| 0.07 |bu| 0.10 |um| 0.15
TABLE 2
Resulting Bigram Model Sentences from
the Example Naive Model Output
Shown in Table 1
Sentence Total Error
|abc | 0:01þ 0:03þ 0:05 ¼ 0:09
|dbc | 0:05þ 0:03þ 0:05 ¼ 0:13
|aec | 0:07þ 0:06þ 0:05 ¼ 0:18
|abum| 0:01þ 0:10þ 0:15 ¼ 0:26
|dbum| 0:05þ 0:10þ 0:15 ¼ 0:30
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we were unable to explore the effect the device itself had on
the accuracy, and since most participants were not ‘owners’
of the phone they had less opportunity to become comfort-
able with the device and keyboard (particularly salient for
non-Android users).
Understanding the factors that modulate the accuracy of
the predictions is essential in fully understanding the phe-
nomena and whether this form of information leakage is
more of a threat to particular individuals or devices in the
Android ecosystem.
Initially we explored the effect of the age on the accuracy
of the most successful prediction experiment (that of using
the bigram approach on text that had been seen previously).
A boxplot of the effect of age is shown in Fig. 15, from this
plot it appears that there is no evidence that performance is
modulated by the age of the participants, this is confirmed
with a Pearson’s Chi-squared test (test statistic of 0.127 and
a p-value of 0.364)
The length of ownership is also of interest, again there
was no correlation between how long the device has been
owned and the accuracy—a Pearson’s Chi-squared test con-
firms this (test statistic of -0.069 and a p-value of 0.623).
Mechanically the physical size of the phone or device
will have some effect on how it is used, for this analysis we
break the devices down using the Android ‘size’ metric.
The accuracy of the approach broken down by the size is
shown in Fig. 16. As can be seen the performance on
‘XLarge’ (i.e., those over 7 inches) devices appears to be
higher than those ‘Normal’ or ’Large’ size. This is confirmed
with two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests as shown in
Table 4 which shows that participants using a device over
7 inches in size in general resulted in an increase in accuracy
over those using smaller phones, albeit at a significance
level of 8.7 percent. It is notable from inspection of the
model parameters that the rotation vectors associated with
larger devices tend to be larger than the parameters associ-
ated with smaller phones. This indicates the mechanical
rotation of larger tablets during typing is greater.
The final question, before the study itself, asked the partic-
ipant how comfortable they were using the soft-keyboard,
the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is shown in Fig. 17. We
were unable to find a significant correlation between the
accuracies across all the factors (from Very Uncomfortable to
Very Comfortable), however the Uncomfortable factor was
significantly higher accuracy than the very comfortable as
shown in Table 5. Since the majority of the Xlarge devices
were associated with users who were Uncomfortable with a
smartphone keyboard it is difficult to isolate these factors.
The comfort level explored in Fig. 17 is a self-declared
comfort level, potentially of more interest is the actual
Fig. 14. The distance between the correct and predicted key for the
bigrams in error.
Fig. 15. The accuracy from different age participants.
Fig. 16. The effect of the device size on the accuracy.
TABLE 4
The Test Statistic from Two-Sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Tests for the Size of the Device, p-values are Denoted
by * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Small Normal Large XLarge
Small No data
Normal - 0.250 0.632 *
Large - - 0.500
XLarge - - -
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observed typing speed as this is likely to be a better indica-
tor of the skill level. The median flight-time (the time
between releasing one key and pressing the next) of an indi-
vidual’s performance was calculated and no significant rela-
tionship was found with respect to the accuracy.
In addition to these factors surrounding the participants,
the accuracy may also be a factor of how the device is held
and used. The accuracy of the prediction when broken down
by handedness and the hand in which the device is held is
shown in Fig. 18. Across these six groups (three different
approaches to holding the phone or tablet and right- and
left-handedness) there was no statistically significant differ-
ence between the performance of the prediction system. Two
of the groups associated with left-handed participants who
hold their device in their right hand or both hands were
potentially under-represented, however given the number
of participants this potentially is an uncommon use pattern.
In combination with how the device is held the digit that
is used to press the keys may also have an effect on the accu-
racy, the digit could be just the fingers (typically with the
device held in the other hand), just the thumbs (typically
with it held in both hands) or a mixture of the two. The
KDE covering the accuracy of the prediction as a function of
these different use patterns is shown in Fig. 19.
In this case there does appear to be some variation
between the different use patterns, two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests were performed across the three factors and
the results are shown in Table 6. As can be seen there is a sta-
tistical difference between those who type with just their fin-
gers and just their thumbs (the relatively uncommon
condition where people use both does show some reduction
in performance it does not achieve statistical significance).
This reduction in performance is explained by directly
observing the traces associated from the devices—in general
when the device is held in both hands and the thumbs used
for the key presses themagnitude of the rotation vectors tend
to be smaller and hence the discriminatory power is reduced.
As previously described the length of ownership has no
effect on the accuracy of the process, however this measure
is linked to the age of the device, as part of the data capture
the manufacturer and model of the phone or tablet is cap-
tured and this was used to calculate the age, we could find
no evidence of a relationship between the age and the accu-
racy. After the experiment the participants were asked how
focused they were during the task and also how easy they
found the task, this is particularly interesting given that pre-
dictive text was disabled so it was important to gather how
easy the participant found the experiment. However, we
found no correlation between accuracy and the how easy
the participant found the task or how distracted they were.
Having analysed the effects of these various factors in
isolation we attempted to build linear models for the accu-
racy given the combination of these factors. No model was
able to explain more than 22 percent of the variance, as mea-
sured by the adjusted R-squared value [38] indicating that
none of the factors captured in this study are predictive of
the accuracy, other than those discussed previously.
4.4 Stability in Prediction over Time
As discussed in the introduction the sensors involved in
smartphones and tablets are small, sensitive and subject to
Fig. 17. The effect of comfort with the device on the accuracy of the
predictions.
TABLE 5
The Test Statistic from Two-Sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for the Effect of how Comfortable the Participant
was with the Soft-Keyboard, p-values are Denoted by * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Very Uncomfortable Uncomfortable Comfortable Very Comfortable
Very Uncomfortable - 0.343 0.343 0.596
Uncomfortable - - 0.407 0.658 ***
Comfortable - - - 0.362
Very Comfortable - - - -
Fig. 18. The effect of how the device is held on the accuracy of the
predictions.
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drift over time. The experiment was re-run with a 10 percent
sample of the participants—this sample was taken to ensure
a spread of devices. This experiment ran 6 months after the
initial experiment and was aimed at exploring the effect of
changes in sensor behaviour over time.
For all users the performance was within 5 percent of the
initial experiment (with an average difference of 0.2 percent)
indicating similar performance levels. More interestingly,
further analysis used the training data from the first run to
build a model that was then used to predict the keypresses
from data acquired 6 months later. This resulted in an aver-
age performance decrease of 8.1 percent.
This decrease can be attributed to the non-linear drift in
the sensor, as we are using the relative change in the phone
from one keypress to the next in order to infer the pair of
keypresses we are unaffected by any linear drift.
4.5 Complex Models
To this point we have demonstrated a very simple approach
to modelling the side-channel leakage, through building a
model from the recorded time series during the training
phase (experiment 1). By visual inspection the models rep-
resenting the bigrams were generally smooth curves. In this
example the full time-series that was used to encapsulate
the model for each bigram could be replaced with the coeffi-
cients from a polynomial function. A fourth-order polyno-
mial was found to be the minimum order of polynomial
that was able to fit the data well.
By simplifying the model using this polynomial approxi-
mation it was possible to reduce the size of the model by
250 times—particularly important if the model is to be
stored on the device and used in real-time. This simplifica-
tion leads to a small decrease of the average performance
across the experiments of approximately 5 to 6 percent. In
some cases, particularly models that performed poorly, this
approach actually improved the accuracy by reducing the
noise component within the training phase of the model cre-
ation. Table 7 compares the performance of the full model
and the polynomial approximation.
This very simple model for the rotation provides a bench-
mark for the lowest possible performance that a relatively
unskilled author of a malicious application could achieve. A
more complex process for comparing the templates within
the model and those provided by a captured time-series
could exploit Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [39], [40], [41]
in order to reduce the effect of any variation in the typing
speed between bigrams. DTW is a process by which the sim-
ilarity between two timeseries can be evaluated indepen-
dent of non-linear variations in their time dimension.
Essentially this approach is used to ‘mitigate against distor-
tions in the time axis’ [42]. There are several other variants
on DTW (e.g., weighted and derivative DTW) that can be
used when comparing timeseries. However, Lines and
Bagnall [43] suggest when there is a warping window size
that is set through cross-validation then DTW is ‘commonly
accepted as the gold standard against which to compare
alternative measures.’ This allows us to calculate the simi-
larity between the training data and a later sampled times-
eries, independent of the time taken to tap the bigrams. In
the simple model we assume that any variation in the time
taken to type a bigram is inherently linear, i.e., if an individ-
ual takes 20 percent longer to type a bigram this increase
in time is distributed evenly across the bigram. Using
Dynamic Time Warping, rather than the RMS error, to cal-
culate the similarity between a measured timeseries and a
given bigram from the training data allows us to remove
this assumption. This allows us to consider the non-linear
variation in the timeseries from the sensors, however there
is a significant impact on the computational requirement.
The use of DTW does however significantly increase
performance across the four experiments as shown in
table 8, indicating there is a significant non-linear compo-
nent in the time dimension of the sampled data. This shows
that if we have the complete word in the training set we
can, on average, accurately identify over 81 percent of
bigrams, if we have seen the bigram before but not the
word in which it appears we can identify, on average,
nearly 30 percent of bigrams. It is worth noting that this is
the average performance and the variation from the mean
is difficult to predict for an individual user. However, there
is some evidence that larger devices lead to a greater
Fig. 19. The effect of how key is pressed on the accuracy of the
predictions.
TABLE 6
The Test Statistic from Two-Sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests
for the Different Ways in which a Keypress Occurs, p-values
are Denoted by * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Just Fingers Just Thumbs Both
Just Fingers - 0.380 ** 0.444 *
Just Thumbs - - 0.325
Both - - -
TABLE 7
The Average Accuracy Using a Polynomial Approximation
for the Model Across the Different Experiments
Experiment Accuracy (%) Performance change (%)
Naive training 44.8 % 9.42 %
Bigram training 66.1 % 5.18 %
Naive unseen 9.90 % 5.70 %
Bigram unseen 15.2 % 5.54 %
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accuracy as do users who type with their fingers whilst
holding the device in one hand.
4.6 Comparative Results
As previously discussed in Section 2 there are a number of
existing approaches to keystroke inference using smart-
phone motion sensors. The research presented in this paper
offers a number of improvements over existing studies both
in terms of the robustness of the approach and also the
results achieved.
TouchLogger [21] focused on determining the keystrokes
on a smartphone soft keyboard using the accelerometer
alone. This method was capable of inferring more than
70 percent of a keystrokes. However, this approach was
limited to only using a numeric keypad, whereas our work
uses an alphanumeric keypad. The work carried out in
TouchLogger, by Cai and Chen, used a single device to col-
lect data, an HTC Evo 4G. The work presented in this paper
used an Android application that was freely available and
as such we were able to infer results from a variety of devi-
ces and also away from strict experimental conditions;
participants were free to hold the device in the way that
most comfortable to them.
The work of Xu et al. [22], TapLogger, uses a similar
approach to Cai and Chen [21] in that they aim to infer key-
strokes on a numeric keypad. However, like our own research
Xu et al. make use of both the accelerometer and gyroscope.
The experiments that they carried out were in a controlled
environment on two specific devices (Google Nexus (One)
and an HTC Aria). The training data amounted to approxi-
mately 400 taps, significantly more than our approach, which
required less than 140 characters. Our own research divides
keystrokes in bigrams, whereas Xu et al. aim to extract single
taps. This approach has the potential to be affected by linear
drift. The experiments carried out as part of TapLogger show
accuracies of between 70 and 99 percent, depending on the
user. Whilst our approach may not have the same levels of
accuracy (as seen in Table 8), we believe that our research
offers a robust and cross-device approach capable of inferring
alphanumeric keystrokes.
Perhaps the closest work to our own is that of Shen et al.
[24], this approach still looked to infer keystrokes on a
numeric keypad but worked with a number of different
devices, data sizes and sampling rates. Their work is capa-
ble of detecting when a keystroke has occurred 100 percent
of the time, which is comparable with our own results. The
accuracy achieved was between 71.4 and 83.9 percent, but
this was dependent on the conditions. Again, the experi-
ments for this work were carried in a controlled environ-
ment; while there were three different devices used this is
still not comparable to our own open experiment.
5 IMPLICATIONS
The naive approach to protecting against this attack is
through requiring an application to explicitly request per-
mission to access the motion sensors for a device. However,
it could be argued that this is largely impractical since the
use of these sensors is so pervasive within applications and
is key to many of the ‘seamless’ parts of the mobile experi-
ence and increasingly leveraged through higher level APIs
such as the Android Activity detection.
Many applications will also have valid requirements for
creating background processes with listeners attached to
the motion sensors, for example fitness trackers. However,
it is more realistic to require these applications that launch
background process which then attach to sensors to explic-
itly request permissions. This would reduce the main threat
demonstrated in this research (that of the leakage of infor-
mation from one sensitive application to a background pro-
cess started by a malicious application).
The granting of permissions for background applications
to access a different activity is already performed with the
‘accessibility’ function, in which an application requests
the ability to read from a different ‘Activity’—it should be
noted, however, that the user experience for this process is
generally poor. It is also worth noting, that this would result
in a complicated situation where the access to the sensors
may or may not require permissions depending on a fairly
technical description on how it is accessed—this is not an
ideal situation for the common user of these devices who is
already struggling to make rational decisions from this
permissions model [10].
The current trends are for devices to have more accurate,
lower noise and faster sampling sensors—largely driven
by the desire for virtual or augmented reality experiences.
Schemes such as Google’s Daydream specification are enco-
uraging devices to be better at sensing both theworld around
them and its position and movement through the environ-
ment. The ability to better sense the world around the device
will, inevitably, increase the potential for sensitive informa-
tion to leak fromwithin an application through this channel.
6 CONCLUSION
The research presented in this paper has demonstrated how
it is possible to estimate the text that has been typed purely
from themotion sensors—explicitly the gyroscope and accel-
erometer. Using a very short training dataset (less than the
size of a tweet) we were able to correctly infer, on average,
over 81 percent of bigrams forming words that were part of
the training set. We were able to correctly identify nearly
30 percent of the bigrams in words that were not part of the
training data.Whilst thismay appear low, it is still of concern
given the very small training size and the fact that typically
languages have significant redundancy in both word and
sentence structure [44], [45], [46], [47], which often allows
pragmatics to be extracted from incomplete text.
This attack could potentially lead to the leakage of sen-
sitive data from a secure application through this ‘zero-
permission’ channel. From our experiment we were not
able to identify any particular characteristics of users or
devices that were more vulnerable than others, however
we did find that the accuracy tended to be higher for
TABLE 8
The Average Accuracy using DTW Across
the Different Experiments
Experiment Accuracy (%) Performance change (%)
Naive training 64.6 % 30.58 %
Bigram training 81.0 % 16.25 %
Naive unseen 18.9 % 80.29%
Bigram unseen 29.5 % 83.20 %
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larger devices and users who used their fingers rather
than thumbs to type.
This research highlights the risk of leakage of potentially
sensitive information from one application to another, poten-
tially malicious, application. The results have shown that
evenwith very simplemodels a good level of accuracy can be
achieved, by using more computationally expensive appro-
aches such as dynamic time warping this can be significantly
improved. It is also worth noting that this research does not
leverage the inherent redundancy within written languages
which means that there is no requirement for 100 percent
accuracy to infer semanticmeaning from the content.
In this paper we also highlight some of the challenges for
defending against these attacks, a number of potential
approaches have been suggested although most are chal-
lenging or would have significant impacts to either the user
experience or the Android ecosystem.
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